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PERSONAL PRIVILEDGE OF HE WITNESS IN CRIMINAfl 
PROCEEDINGS.
Introduction.
That no person should be compelled to accuse himslf or
give evidence which would incr-iminate himself was one of
those prinniples of evidence old enough to have been crystal-
ized into a maxim before the Law of Evidence came into existen
ence. Not less resp cted for its antiquity than for it sforth
it has long been lauded as one of the distinguished and distiq
guishing features of tha t Anglo Saxon jurisprudence which has
ever regarded the protection of the personal rights of the
individual as one of its most sacred aims.
ihe tirm and manner of the introduction of this princi-.
ple into 1nglish law mu t be purely a matter of conjecture.
The earliest forms of trial, the denial by oath, the compurga-
tion, the ordeal, the trial by jury without evidence submit.
ted, and trial by wager of battle involved no examination of
witnesses. Trials by a jury to whom evidence was submitted
occurred as early as the twelfth century, but during that cen-
tury the trial by compurgation was most ecu-xmon and it was not
2until the time of THenry T1. that these jury trials with wit-
nesses were fully established. "ere can scarcely be any
doubt that they were inquisitorial in their mehtods; and that
a strong prejudice a,-;ainst such ethods soon orew up. .he
fact that parties in civil suits Tere :i.ot allowed to act as
witnesses for themselves nor compelled to give evidence a-
f-ainst themselves was, in all probability, the source of the
claim that a similar -, lan would be pursued in criminal trials.
During the century preceding the revolution of 1688 we find
(a)
numerous cases boldly asserting this principle for the protec-
tion of' both witnesses and accused, but nevertheless the exam-
ination of the prisoner himself formed the principal part of
the trial during that same period, and the crown was con-
stanitly over-riding the law with its royal prerog-rative and is-
suin-, warrants under v:rich witnesses and prisoners were tor-
tured to obtain evidence and confessions. In th is state of
affairs the revolution of 1688 produced a decided change. It
has be n well said that the cai v6 f Evidence dates from tr:is
point; and it is not at all surprising that a revolution
whose purpose w.as to assert and aintain the righ,-ts of th: e
peoplc should result in the permanent est Di ishient of tile
personal privilegTe of both the witness and the accused. Tis
(a) Lei~h's ease and T: r _de' Case cited in 5 i; ils.
50; Collier v. Collier, 1 Cro-ke, 201; h i:-to ~Iolt's Case,
3 Croke,388; ]Lurro;'s . ...as 3,  _1ds.G 2enC1 0-. i o
ba r t,8; Cooke's . aseI SCak, l5.
3privilege, thus earl. established, has been ever regarded a.
one of the safe guards of personal freodom, and as such h-s
been asserted, in one form or another in the Constitution of
the United States and in those of nearly all the states of the
Union.
The application of this general principle mnd the settle-
ment of the nunerous points of dispute which necessarily a-
rose was, of course, a matter for the courts: and the purpose
of this thesis is to select and classify the best results of
such judicial interpretation.
SEC. L. EXTFTTT OF TIlE COSTITUTI HAL PROVISIO'S.
It is of importance in this discussion to u nderstand the
extent of these constitutional provisions so that v-re ray de-
termine whether the privilege of the vritnes reste upon com-
mon law or statutory ; -asis and is thus subject to change by
the le-islature, or whether it is more firmly fixed in the con-)
stitution of the United States and of the several states. An
examination of the constitutional and statutory provisions
will show a marked diversity in language. In the constitu-
tions of Georgia, California, New York and the United States
the provision is that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal, case to be a witness against himself. In others we
find "H o man can be compelled to ;.-ive evidence a-ainst him-
self"; in prosecutions the accused "shall nct be coiipelled to
F-ive evidence aj!ainst -imsclf1" that no pe-rson inahy:-crtminal
prosecution, shall be compelled to ,-ive evidence ag ainst him-
self; that no person sh:all. be"compelled to accuse or furnish
evidence against himself. YTith sucb a provision in t-, state
constitution of '1rnv York the ea'licrn decisions rst tis rigt ht
5entirely upon common law authority. Later the common law
(a)
doctrine was embodied in the Code, and since that time the
cases have rested their decisions upon the Code. In People
v. Kelly (24 N. Y. 74), the court said, "It is perfectly well
settled that where there is no legal provision to protect the
witness against the reading of the testimony on his own trial,
he cannot be compelled to answer. (The People v Mather, 4
Wend. 229, and casesthere referred to.) This course of adju-
dication did not result from any judicial construction of the
constitution, but is a branch of the common law doctrine which
excuses a person from giving testimony which will tend to dis-
grace him, to charge him with a penalty or forfeiture, or to
convict him of a crime. It is of course competent for the
legislature to change any doctrine of the common law, but I
think they could not compel a witness to testify on the trial
of another person to facts which would prove himself guilty
of a crime without indemnifying him against the consequences,
because I think, as has been mentioned, that by a legal con-
struction the constitution would be found to forbid it". While
in New York the question is thus involved in obscurity, the
United States Courts have decided squarely that the meaning of
(a) Code of Crim. Pro. Sec. 10; Code of Civ. Pro. Sec.
837.
the constitutional provision is not merely that I person shall
not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a crimi-
nal prosecution against himself; but its object is to ensure
that a person shall not be compelled, when acting as a wit-
ness in any investigation, to give testimony which may tend
to show that he himself has committed a crime. In this hold-
(a)
ing the state courts have very generally concurred. A court
which holds to the strict construction that the constitution-
al privilege applies only to the accused in a proceeding a-
gainst himself would also be compelled toiold that in prelimt-
inary proceedings, the investigations of the coroner and of
the Grand Jury, the constitutional protection would not apply
as that would be no proceeding against any person, and there-
fore the legislature would be enabled to give and grant the
privilege at its pleasure.
(a) State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307.
Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255.
Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184.
Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153.
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
Cull en v. Comm., 24 Gratt. 624.
State v. Nowell, 58 N. H. 314.
L~a Fontaine v. So. Underwriters, 83' N. Car. 132.
Temple v. Comm., 75 Va. 892.
7SEC.2on.sjr2uci0fn liberal. The courts have uniformly held
that such constitutional and statutory provisions must 
be
most broadly and liberally construed as an immunity or privi-
(a)
lege. This should be clearly kept in mind throughout the en-
tire discussion.
SEC.# Books and pa&ers. In accordance with this broad construe
tion it is held that the witness is excused from producing
books or papers, the contents of which may be used against
(b)
him.
SEC.4.-Tendency to incriminate. The constitutional aril statuto-
ry privileges give the witness his privilege not only as to
those questions the answers to which might directly incrimi-
nate him but also when the answers might tend to subject him
to a legal prosecution. The language of Judge Marshall in
(c)
Burr's Trial has long been regarded as an accurate statement
(a) Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547.
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
State v. Newell, 58 N. H. 314.
Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463.
Minters v. People, 139 Ill. 363.
Temple v. Commronwealth, 75 Va. 892.
Printz v. Cheeney, 11 Iowa, 469.
People v. Mather, 4 Wend 230
Stevens v. State, 50 Kansas, 712.
Warren v. Lucas, 10 Ohio, 337.
Peo. v. Brewer, 27/ Mich. 134.
Fellows v. Wilson, 31 Barb. 162.
Peo. ex rel Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N . Y. 219
(b) Rapaije on Witnesses, Sec. 262.
Byass v. Sulliuan, 21 How. Pr. 50-
Wharton's Law of Evidence, Sec. 751 and cases cited.
1 Burr's Trial, 245.
8the law. " Many links frequently compose that chain of
testimony, which is necessary to convict an individual of a
crime. It appears to the court to be the true sense of the
rule, that no witness is compellable to furnishA any one of
them against himself. It is certainly not only a possible
but a probable case, that a witness by disclosing a single
fact, may complete the testimony against himself, and. to every
effectual purpose, accuse himself entirely, as he would by
stating every circumstance which would be required for his
conviction. That fact of itself would be unavailing, but all
other facts without it would be insufficient. While that re-
mains concealed in his own bosom, he is safe; but draw it fran
thence and he is exposed tio a prosecution. The r Qle which
declares that no man is compellable to accuse himself would.
most obviously be infringed by compelling a witness to dis -
close a fact of this description.
(a)
This rule has been generally followed without hesitation.
(a) Best on Ev. Am. Notes.
Printz v. Cheeney, 11 Iowa, 439.
Peo. v.. Mather, 4 Wen. 429.
Rich nan v. State, 2 Green (Iowa) 532.
Comm. v. Howell, 5 Gratt ( Va.) 334.
Burns v. Kempshall, 24 Wend. 330.
'Bank of Salina v. Henry, 1 U. Y. 83.
Stewart v. Turner, 3 Edw. Ch. 458.
9SEC. 5. DISGRACE.
But farther than this the constitutions do not go, and
the claim of the privilege W where the answer might disgrace
must rest entirely on other foundations. The discussion of
this claim has resulted in this country in a great nass of con-
fused and contradictory decisions. The subject has been
complicated by the weighty reasons which may be urged both pro
and con; by the uncertainty as to the rule in England, and by
the statutes passed in many of the states, making it possible
to prove his former criminal record by the witness. Then
many courts used loose language in decisions on the subject
when the objection to the question was made by the counsel for
one of the parties on the ground of irrelevancy. Added to
this was the confusion of the discretionary power of the judge
over cross-examination with the privilege of the witness.
Nevertheless, it is believed that the following propositions
will be found to be in accord with the better line of cases,
and will reconcile most justly the rights of the parties to
whatever evidence the witness can give, the rights of the wit-
ness, and the demands of public policy.
(I) There the question imputing disgrace is irrelevant
to the issue and. also to the credibility of thle witness,
counsel for the opposite party may object, the witness may
claim his privileg, and the judge at hif discretion may ex
l0
clude the question althiough there has been neitler objection
(a)
nor claim of privilege.
(2) When the question is material to the issue, t3l
witness should be compelled t'o answer, notwithstanding he
(b)
bring disgrace upon himself by so doing.
(a) Peo. v. Crapo, 73 N. Y. 288.
Peo. v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 541.
Hayward v. Peo. 9^ Ill. 492.
(b) Wharton I, Sec. 542.
Greenleaf I, Sec. 454.
Lohman v. Peo. 1 N. Y. 379.
Taylor v. Jennings, 7 Rob. 581.
Peo. v. Mather, 4 Wen. 250.
1 Burr's Tr. 244.
State v. Staples, 47 N. H. 113.
Gutterson v. Morse, 58 N. H. 165.
Smith v. Casster, 1 Gray, 108.
Comm v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574.
Burnett v. Whalon, 11 Abb. Pr. 157.
West v. Lynch, 7 Daily, 245.
Peo. v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 541.
Howell v. Commn. 5 Gratt, 664.
State v. Patterson, 2 Ired. L. 346.
Hunt v. Mc Calla, 20 Iowa, 20.
Ragland v. Wickware, 4 J. J. Marsh, 530.
Jennings v. Prentice, 39 Mich. 421.
Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 98.
Ex Parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184.
Cls.rk v. Reese, 35 Cal. 89.
Peo. v. Furtado, 57 Cal. 345.
Brite v. Stile, 10 Tex. App. 368.
Stephens Dig; of Ev. Sec. 129, in
Chase's Ed. Note 1, P. 225.
Kendrick v. Comm. 78 Va. 490.
Contra.
Vaughn v. Perrino, 2 Penn. (N.J.) 29 9.
Merlwzzi v. Gleeson, 59 Md. 214.
U. S. v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C. 729.
Galbraith v. Eichelberger, 3 Yeat es, 515.
Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140.
Ingall v. State 48 Wis. 647.
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(3) But when the question imputing disgrace is not ma-
terial to the issue and is put only for the purpose of testing
(a)
the credibility of the witness, he may decline to answer.
(a) See cases cited supra to effect that witness may
refuse to answer any question which might dis-
grace him, and
R. v. Hodgslon, R. & R. 211.
Dodd v. Morris, 4 Camp. 519.
Friend's Case, 4 St. Tr. 225.
Lewis's Case, 4 Esp. 225.
U. S. v. Dickinson, 2 Mc Lean, 325.
St. v. Rollins, 77 Me. 380.
State v. Staples, 47 N. H. 113.
Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray, 108.
Peo. v. Herrick,, 13 Johns. R. 82.
Lohman v. Peo. 1 Coms t. 379.
In Re Lewis, 39 How. Pr. 155.
Resp v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates, 429.
State v. Bailey, 1 Penn. ( N.J.) 304.
Vaughn v. Perrine, 2 Penn. ( N.J.) 534.
Houser v. Comm. 51 Pa. St. 332.
Howel v. Comm. 5 Gratt, 664.
Forney v. Ferrell, 4 W. Va. 729.
Leach v. Peo. 53 Ill. 311.
Hayward. v. Peo. 96 Ill. 492.
State v. Garrett, 1 Busbee, 357.
Campbell v. St. 23 Ala. 44.
Marx v- Bell, 48 Ala. 497.
Washington v. State, 63 Ala. 189.
Harper v. R. R. 47 Mo. 567.
Shepard v. Parker, 36 N. Y. 517.
Peo. v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73.
Chase's Stephen's Dig. of Ev. Note 1,
p. 225, and cases cited.
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Of the situation in Engl.atnd, Greenleaf says, in Sec. 459,
The treat question, however, whether a witness may not be
" bound in some cases to answer an interrogatory to his own
" moral degraoation, where. , though it is collateral to the
main issue, it is relevant to his character for veracity,
" has not yet been brought into direct and solemn judgnent,,
" and must therefore be regarded. as an open question, notwith-
" standing the practice of eminent judges at Nisi Prius in
" favor of the inquiry, under the limitations we have above
" stated. 
Statutory changes have been numerous; mostly in the line
of permitting his former criminal record to be proved by the(a)
witness himself. But mere charges or indictments m-
(b)
not be inquired into, since they are consistent With innocence
Some states, as Iowa and Georgia, have statutes giving to wit-
nesses the same privilege of refusal where the answer would
disgrace, as the comrmn law gave where the answer would incrim
(c)
inate.
(a) N. Y. Code of Civ. Procedure, Sec. 832.
Common Law Proc. Act, 1854, 17 & 18,
Vict. C. 125, Sec. 25 & 103.
28 Vict. C. 18, Sec. 6.
(b) Pee. v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 2838.
Peo. v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571.
Ryan v. Peo. 79 N. Y. 594.
(c) Iowa Cod.e, Sec. 3647.
Georgia Code, Sec. 3814.
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SEC. 6. CIVIL LIABILITY.
But a witness cannot excuse himself on the r ound. that
(a)
his answer would expose him to civil liability.
SEC. 7. HUSBAND OR WIFE.
The privilege extends to answers.which would criminate,
tend to incriminate, or disgl'ace the wife or husband of the
witness. Even in the inquisitorial proceedure of Rome, wit-
nesses were not compelled to give evidence against near rela-
(b)
tives. For a long period of the English law this formed
a part of that exclusionary rule which prohibited a husband or
(c)
wife from acting as witnesses one for the other. The
reform in evidence has swept aside the exclusion, but retained
(d)
the privilege.
(a) Civ. Code N. Y. See. 837.
46 Geo. III, C. 37.
Wharton's Ev. I, See. 537, and numerous cases cited.
(b) Hunter's Roman Law, p. 900.
(c) State v. Welch, 26 Me. 30.
State v. Gardner, 1 Root, 485.
Peo. v. Horton, 4 Mich. 37.
Comm. v. Sparks, 7 Allen, 534.
The Inhabitants of Cliviger, 2 T. R. 233.
(di Comm. v. Reid, 8 Phil. Rep. 385.
State v. Briggs, 9 R. 1. 361.
St ate v. Dudley, 9 Wis. 664.
State v. Bridgeman, 49 Vt. 202.
St ate v. Marvin, 35 N. H. 22.
Cartwright v. Green, 8 Vesey, 405.
Regina v. Halliday, Bell 257.
Regina v. All Saints, 6 M.& S. 200.
2 Taylor's Ev. 1453.
Best on Ev. p. 533.
Stephens Digest of Ev. Sec. 120.
Law of 1872, C. 182, Sec. 715 Pen. Code. N. Y.
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SEC. 8. PRIVILEGE PURELY PERSONAL.
The privilege is purely a personal one, and. can be clai-rn
ed only by the witness himself; not by the party against whom
(a)
he is called. Neither is it the privilege of c ounsel
(b)v0
to interpose the objection. It is a question between the
witness and. the court with which the party has nothing ta do.,
iid with which the counsel for neither party has any right to
interfere. But if the question be irrelevant, or immaterial
or objectionable to either party for any other sufficient rea-
sa)n, the counsel may interpose his objections, and the question
may be ruled out. But in cases of privilege, the question
may be asked and the vritness compelled to answer or rel upon(c)
his privilege.
(a) Comvm. v. Shaw, 4 Cush. 594.
Clark v. Reese, 35 Cal. 89.
Coburn v. Odell, 30 N. H. 540.
Macarty v. Bond, 9 La. 351.
Regina v. Kinglake, 11 Cox. 499.
(b) Tlomas v. Newton, M.& M. 48.
Regina v. Adey, 1 M. & R. 94.
State v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234.
(c) Peo. v. Arnold, 40 Mich. 710.
U. S. v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C. 732.
Vaughn v. Perrine, 3 N. 5. L. 728.
Fries v. Brugher, 12 N. 5. L. 79.
Chamberlain v. Wilson, 12 Vt. 439.
Treat v. Browning, 4 Conn. 408.
Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 259.
Newcomb v. St ate, 37 Miss. 38 3.
Low v. Mitchell, 18 Me. 372.
St. v. Bilansky, 3 Minn. 246.
Simmns v. Holster, 13 Minn. 249.
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Although counsel for witnesses are not recogrized in le-
gal trials, nevertheless I see no reason why a witness who is
in danger of being brought to trial for a criminal offense,
who is perhaps made a witness for the express purpose of draw-
ing from him damaging evidence, may not have counsel as t:e his
legal right to refuse to answer any question. A keen law-
yer may see the drift of an entangling question and have decis
-ion to refuse to answer where the stupid witness would sus -
pect nothing, and the frightened fail to take advantage of the
privilege. This rule will undoubtedly go the way of that
one which refused counsel to prisoners aceused of felony.
It is considered the duty of' the judge to warn the witness,
but the judge is often totally unprepared for such a duty and
more often neglects it entirely. Any witness who is in
danger has the right to the keen, interested assistsnce of a
legal adviser, who is perfectly familiar with the situation in
all its aspects.
SEC. 9. DUTY OF JUDGIE.
The position of the judge when an incriminating question
is asked and b efor-e the witness has claimed his privilege has
not been accurately and definitely determined, but the better
authorities hold that the judge is not bound at the request
of a party, or on his own motion, to notify the waitness of his
(a)
privilege in tis relation; though he mar at his discretion
16
(b)
give an intimation to this efrect, and when -tle witness
appears to be ignorant of his rights in thiis respect, it is
(c)
proper tbat he should be advised of them. But neither
of the parties to the action, nor the witness, could claim any
relief for the failure of the judge to so advise the witnesses.
(a) Atty. Gen. v. Radloff, 10 Exq. R. 83.
U. S.v.Darnand, 2 Wall Jr. 143 - 179.
Comm. v. Shaw, 4 Cush. 594.
Wharton on Ev. I, Sec. 535.
(b) Fisher v. Ronalds, 12 C. B. 764.
R. v. Boyse, 2 Fost. & F. 158.
Foster v. Pierce, 11 Cush. 437.
Comm. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472.
Mayo v. Mayo, 119 Mass.. 292.
(c) Friend's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 15.
Dixon v. Vale, 1 C. & P. 278.
R. v. Wheater, 2 Mood C. C. 95.
Southard. v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254.
Rosewell's Case, 10 How. St. Tr. 168.
R. v. De Berenger, Gurney, 194.
Lord Cardig'an's G se, Gurney, 79.
St. v. Bilansky, 3 Minn. 246.
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SEC. 10. WAIVER.
The witness may, of course, waive his privilege and ans-
(a)
wer the question. But a waiver may alsQ be inferred
from the previous conduct of the witness in relation to other
questions. The question then comes, at what point in the
examination can the privilege be claimed. The answer to
this in England is thus stated by Best, See. 129: " It used
"to be considered that the witness who intended to claim the
"privilege of not answering questions of this nature was bound
"to claim his privilege at once; and that, if he began a crim-
"inative statement when he might have refused to make it, he
"was compellable to go on with it,- a rule pr-obably establish-
"ed with a view of preventing witnesses from converting the
"privilzege given by law for their own protection, into a means
"of serving one of the litigant parties, by setting up the pri-
"vilege when their eviden-ce began to tell against him. But
"in Reg. v. Garbett, 2 Car. & K. 495, a majority of the judges
"overruled the old notion, and held that the witness might
"claim his protection at any stage of the inquiry."
(a) Ohamberlayn 's Best on EU.
Am. notes, p. 538, and cases cited.
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Whatever may be the effect of Reg. v. Garbett in England,
in this country the rule is not so settled. As long as
there has arisen no prejudice to either party by the testimony
already given, there is no doubt that the witness may assert
his right at any time, whether or not crimination has been in-
(a)
volved in the part already stated. But when a witness
voluntarily opens an account of a transaction exposing him to
a criminal prosecution and gives evidence which will assist
him or the party calling him, he is obliged to complete the
narrative and cannot rely on his privilege on direct or cross-
(b)
examination* It amounts to a waiver of his right.
(a) Wharton, See. 539.
(b) Peo. v. Freshour, 55 Cal. 375.
Wharton, See. 539.
Rapalje on Witnesses, See. 269.
Comm. v. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462.
State v. K. 4 N. H. 562.
Coburn v. Odell, 10 Foster (N.H.) 540.
Foster v. Pierce, 11 Cush. 437.
Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Verm. 491.
Daw v. Mitchell, 18 Me. 374.
1 Stark Ev. 3rd Ed. 298.
Comm. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472.
Peo. v. Carroll, 3 Park C. R. N. Y.) 73.
Peo. v. Lohman, 2 Barb. 216.
Youngs v. Yboungs, 5 Redf. ( N. Y.) 505.
Alderman v. Pe'o. 4 Mich. 414.
Locke v. State, 63 Ala. 5.
State v. Blake, 25 Me. 350.
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A dictum in Coburn Y. Odell, 10 Foster, 553, states the
limits of this rule in a satisfactory manner. " If a witness
"purposely states a part of the transaction, siich- as. will make
"for him or the party calling him, even though but slightly,
"he should not be protected; but where it is apparent thaat he
"intends to disclose nothing that may require his going farther
"and what he does disclose may well enough stand without affect-
"ing the point at issue, and moreover is drawn out by questions
"where the full effect of the answers cannot readily be seen
"by him, his privilege shall not thereby be taken from him. 
But it was held in Temple Y. Comm. 75 Va. 892, that the
fact that a witness testified before a grsnd jury, and on his
evidenice an indictment was found-, will not deprive him of his
privilege of decliningir to testify on the trial. Cullen's
Case, 24 Gratt., contains a similar holding, where the prelim-
inary examination was at a coroner's inquest.
SEC. l1. LOSS.
The privilege may be lost through the operation of a
pardon, of the statute of limitations, and of the statutes
(a)
granting indemnity and amnesty. But a pardon, or the
Statute of Limitations, affect only the liability to incrimi-
nation and leave the witness still liable to disgrace.
(a) Wharton I Sec.540.
20
Text, writers and judges have laid no stress on this dis-
tinction, but it is highly probable that in a case where it
is proper to grant the privilege of silence because the answer
would disgrace, the courts will grant it, even when the wit-
ness is protected by a pardon or the statute of limitations.
In such cases the reasons for the rule still exist in undimin-
ished force, and no sufficient considerations can be found why
the witness should be deprived of its benefits. An exami-
nation of the cases cited by text writers as authority far the
general proposition that a witness will be compelled to' answer
when released from liability by a pardon or the statute of lin-
itations, will show that they are all cases in wlich the ques-
tion asked was relevant and material to the issue, and. there-
fore the fact that the answers would disgrace the witness
(a)
could form no basis for a claim of privilege. Few of the
English cases are of any value in this connection, but The
Trial of Reading, 7 How.St.Tr. 296; Reg. v. Earl of Shaftes-
bury, 6 How. St. Tr. 1171; and Reg. v. Boyes, 1 B. & S., at page
321, uphold the view here advanced.
(a) Roberts v. Allat, 1 M. & Malk. 192.
Parkhurst v. Lowten, 1 Mer. 400.
Williams v. Farrington, 2 Cox Oh. R. 202.
Davis v. Reid, 2 Sime. 443.
Close v., Aiken, 1 Den. 319.
Bank of Salina v. Henry, 2 Den. 155.
Weldon v. Burch, 12 111. 374.
U. S. v. Smith, 4 Day ( Conn.) 121.
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Numerous statutes have been passed compelling the witness
to testify, but protecting him against incrimination. In this
connection the question whether the constitutional provis ion
protects witnesses becomes important; for in those states
which hold that the constitutional privilege extends only to
the accused and that the privilege of the witness depends on
statutory or common law, any statute upon this subject will be
valid and no question of its constitutionality can arise.
But where it has been held. that the constitutional provision
is broad enough to protect witnesses, the relation of the
statutes to the constitution enters into the discussion.
Without going into a close analysis of these statutes, we my
two
divide them generally intoAclasses: those providing that
no prosecution for the crime in question shall ever be brought
against the witness; and those providing that the evidence
shall not be used against the witness on any criminal prosec-
tion. Statutes of the first class give complete imaunity
and are everywhere regarded as cons titutional. As toa those
of the second class, the courts are divicded. The Supr'eme
Court of the United States, in the late case of Couns elman v.
HiitchcocIk (142 U. 5. 547), expresses the better opinion in
these words: " In view of th e constitutional privilege, a
"statutory enactment to be valid must afford absolute immunity
"against future prosecution for the offense to which the ques-
"tion relates." Referring to the provision in question, tine
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Court says: " This, off course, protected him against the use
"Of his testimony against him or his property in any prosecu-
"tion against him or his property in any crLi'nal proceeding,
In a court of the United States. But it had. only that effect.
It could not and would not, prevent the use of his testimony
"to search out other testimony to bfe used in evidence against
"him or his property, in a criminal proceeding in such court.
' It could. not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses
"and evidence which shiould be attributable directly to the tes
"timony he might give under compulsion, and. on which he mi ht
"bie convicted, when otherwise, and. if he had refu.sed to answer,
"he could not possibly have been convicted. " Emery's case
(107 Mass. 112) holds to the same effect, that it is a reason-
able construction of the constitutional provision that the wit-w
ness is protected from being compelled to disclose the circum-
stances of his offense; the sources from which, or the means
by which, evidence of its commission, or" of his connection
with it, may be obtained, or made effectual for his conviction(a)
without using his answers as direct evidence against him.
(a) Cullen v. Comm. 24 Gatt. 624.
State v. Nowell, 58 N. H. 314.
Temple v. Comm. 75 Va. 892.
Contra.
State v. Quarl~s, 13 Ark. 307.
Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255.
Ex Parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184.
Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153.
Peo. v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74, approved in
Peo. v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427.
La Fontaine v. So. Underwriters, 83 N. C. 132.
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In Counselman v. Hitchcock (supra), Mr. Justice Blatchford
says of these conflicting decisions: " It is contended on the
"part of the appellee that the reason why the courts in Va.,
"Mass., and. N. H. have lheld that the exonerating statute must
"be so broad as to give thie witness complete amnesty, is that
"the constitutions of these states give to the witness, a broad-
"er privilege and exemption than is granted by the constitution
"of the United States, in that thgeir language is that the wit-
"ness shall not be compelled to accuse himself, or furnish evi-
"dence against himself, or givej evidence against himself; and
"it is contended that the terms of the constitution of the
"United States and of the constitution of Georgia, California
"and New York are more restricted. But we are of opinion that
"however this difference may have been commented on in same of
"the decisions, there is really in spirit and principle, no
"distinction arising out of such difference in language. 
SEC. 12. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THE PRIVILEGE IS ALLOWED.
Cases and text writers have involved this point in need-
less confusion. The circ- nstances under ',vhich the right is
claimed have of necessity varied widely; the coensiderstions
which are taken into account in arriving at any one decision
are many: nevertheless, when a cour't was called upon to apply
the law to one particular set of circumstances, it proceeded
to settle the law of the entire subject, a labor fraught with
Lreat danger. Of course, we .must expect to mee-t difficulty
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and conflict. We have to reconcile the right of the people
in criminal proceedings, and of the contesting parties in
civil proceedings, to whatever evidence the witness can give,
with the personal right of the witness. We must recognize
that this privilege will be claimed by those honestly entitled
to its protection, and also by those who are endeavoring under
its cover to defeat the purpose of the law. In spite of
these difficulties, the theory is of vastly greater difficulty
than the practice, and the majority of those cases which have
indulged in deceptive dicta have decided the q-estions involv-
ed in a much more satisfactory manner; so that it is believed
that definite propositions can be laid down covering this sub-
ject, which can be well supported by reason and authority.
In the first place, we must get rid of one error which
meets us in every text book and report; this is, the idea that
any case-has held, or that any case can hold, that the witness
and not the judge decides the question whether or not the pri-
vilege shall be granted. This is no real error, but rather
a misuse of terms. The judge always is, and always must be,
the one who decides what evidence is adrissable and what privi-
leges are to be granted to witnesses. All the witness can
do is to claim his privilege, and state the grounds of the
claim. No case has ever gone farther than to say that such
evidence, when given under oath, was conclusive of the ques-
tion, and even this rule has always been qualified by the
statement that it is not conclusive when the judge can clearly
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see contumacy or error on the part of the witness. The judge
is always the arbiter in any claim of privilege; the discus -
sion must be of the anount and kind of evidence which it is
necessary to bring before hil.
One other point of more vital importance must be settled
at the beginning of this discussion. Roscoe in his Crimi-
nal Evidence, at page 140, says: " Of course, the witness
"must always pledge his oath that he will incur risk;" and
this has been called thi rule in a niunbcr of decisions.
Obviously, such a rule renders the privilege wortlless. It
compes a man upon his oath to accuse himself, in order tie
gain the then worthless privilege of silence. In a question
the answer to which might directly criminate,,the unconstitu -
tionality of such a method is clearly seen. The witness must
swear that the truthful answer would incriminate hin, testify
to his own guilt, and thereupon the judge will most graciously
permit him to be silent. To give any effect to the consti-
tution, the rule must be thmt the witness may clanim his privi-
lege., on the ground that one of th~e possible answers would in-.
criminate, without swearing that the truthful answer would do
so. Where the answer might disclose a fact tending to in-
criminate, the oath of the witness may be usefu l in convincing
the judge that the tr'utliful answer w:ould form a link in the
chain of evidence, but such an oath cannot be reTarded as a
prerequisite to the granting of thie pr'ivilege.
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The witness may claim his privilege on any one of three
grounds:
(1) That one of the possible answers would disgrace him.
(2) That one of the possible answers would directly in-
criminate him.
(3) That one of the possible answers would tend to in -
criminate him.
In the first of these cases there is no difficulty. The
court will not grant the claim, unless it can see that one of
the probable answers would directly disgrace the witness.
As Judge Marshall expresses it, in Burr's Trial, "'Where a
"witness claims to be excused from answering a question, be-
"cause the answer may disgrace him, or render him infamous,
"the court must see that the answer may, without the interven-
(a)
"t ion of other facts, fix on him moral turpitude. "
No serious difficulty meets us in the second class, and
it may be laid down as the correct rule that when the court
can see from the circumstances of the case and the nature of
the evidence, that any answer to the q aestion in the reasona-
ble course of events would lead directly to a crtrninal prose-
cut ion against the witness, tZhe court should grant the
(a) Phillipps II, Star Page 941, C. II. & E's Note.
Greenleaf, Sec. 454.
Taylor's Ev. II, 1462.
Peo. v. Mather, 4 Wend. 250.
Mac Bride V. Mac Bride, 4 Esp. Rep. 242.
Parkhurst v. Lowton, 1 Mer. 400.
priv ile)ge.
In case three, the court must first determnine from the
circumstances of the cese and the nature of thie evidence,
whether there is reasonable ground to apprehend that the de-
fendant is liable to a criminal prosecut ion upon the rnound
suggested by the ouestion. If the court decides that there
is no reasonable ground to apprehend that the defendant is so
(b)
liable, the witness will be compelled to answer the question.
But if the judge decides that there is reasonable ground for
such apprehension, then the prisoner is in danger, and the
judge should permit him t o refuse to answer a question, any
answer to whikch would tend to incriminate him, even though the
judge cannot see how the answer would form a link in a chain
(c)
of criminating evidence.
(a) Regina v. Boyes, 9 W. R. 690.
Fisher v. Ronalds, 12 C. B. 762.
Stevens v. St'ate, 50 Kas. 712.
Ward v. State, 2 Mto. 98.
Fellows v. Wilson, 31 Barb, l3'2.
(b)I Burr's Trial, 245.
St. v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348.
Youngs v. Youngs, 5 Redf. 505.
In Re As ton, 27 Beav. 474.
(c) Chase's Note to Stephen's Dig. of Ev. 209.
Taylor on Ev. II, Sec. 1457.
Wharton's Law of Ev. I, Sec. 53 3.
Peo. v. Mather, 4 Wen. 235.
Temple v. Comm. 75 Va. 892.
Janvrin v. Scam mon, 10 Foster ( N. H.) 280.
State v. Edwards, II Not t & MA. C. 13 ( S. S.)
Short v. Mercier, 15 Jur. 93.
Lamb v. Munster, L. R. 10 Q. 3. D. 110.
(al 27
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Let us analyze this proposition more closely. The
possible, circumstances may be divided into three classes.
(a) The Court sees that the witness is in danger; a
question- is asked, the answer to which the judge can see would
tend to incriminate the witness. Of course, the privilege is
allowed.
(b) The prisoner is in danger, the privilege is claimed;
but the judge can see either contumacy or the impossibility of
any answer incriminating, or tending to incriminate. Here,
of course, the privilege will be denied.
(c) The witness in danger, a question asked; but thie
judge is unable to see how any answer would tend tio incrimi-
nate: that is, he is unable tfo see just how any answer would
form a link in a chain of incriminating evidence. Neverthe-
less, he should give the prisoner the benefit of the doubt and
grant the privilege. In such a case, "reasonable grounds
"exist for apprehending danger to the witness from his being
"compelled to answer."
Those cases wlhich are commnly cited as holding ,that the
decision rests with the witness, hold no more than this.
An examination of them will uiorzn-l show that the witness
was already in danger of a criminal prosecution in regard to
the matter under consideration, and th]at therefore the court
accepted his oath as sufficient evidence of the connection of
the answer with the subject matter. For example, Poole v.
Perritt ( I Speers S , 121 ), here the reporter says:
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" The presiding judge was of opinion, that he was not bound
" to answer the question, as it might, by being followed up
" by other questions, fix upon him the charge of gaming. "
Also, Printz v. Cheeney (11 Iowa, 469), " The question asked
" tended to obtain from the witness certain facts which would
" prove that he was present and. aided in the commission of the
offense. "
Warner v. Lucas (10 Ohio, 337), c.ontains a dictum which
goes farther than this in favor of the witness, but this can
be supported by neither reason nor authority.
But all these propositions must be qualified by the rule
expressed in Taylor v. Forbes (143 N. Y. 231): " The weight
"of authority seems to be in favor of the rule that the wit-
"ness may be compelled to answer when he contumaciously refus-
"es, or when it is perfectly clear and. plain that he is mis-
"taken, and that the answer cannot possibly injure him, or
"tend in any degree to subject him to the peril of prcsecution.
" But the courts have recognized the impossibility in most
"cases of anticipating the effect of the answer, where it is
"not so perfectly evident and manifest that the answer' called
"for cannot incriminate, as to preclude all reasonable doubt
"or fair argument, the privilege must be recognized anid pro-
"tected. "
See also Janvriin v. Scammon (29 N. H. 230).
"0
SEC. 13. SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS.
Evidence which the witness is compelled to give cannot
(a)
be used against him in any subsequent proceedings; nor
the fact that le took advant-age of his privilege and refused
(b)
to answer.
(a) State v. Bailey, 54 Iowa, 414.
Gr. Ev. Sec. 451.
Reg. v. Garbett, 2 C.& K. 474.
Conn. Rev. Stat. 1849, Title 6, See. 161.
Virg. Code 1849, C. 199, Sec. 22.
Roscoe Crim. Ev. p. 148.
Starkin on EV. Star Page 206.
Horstman v. Kau4 fman, 97 Pa. St. 147.
Hendrickson v. Peo. 10 N. Ye, 9, 27, 31.
(b) Wharton Ev. I, Sec. 53g.
State v. Bailey, 54 Iowa, 414.
Rapalje on Witnesses, Sec. 267.
Andrews v. Frye, 104 Mass. 234.
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CONCLUSION.
While many of the leading principles upon which the law
of evidence is founded were known and adrnitted at an early
period, it is nevertheless beyond doubt that the law of evi-
dence has a history of not more than two hundred. and fifty
years. It has been frequently said that no law of evidence
existed prior to 1688. Since that time the developement has
been rapid, and great reforms have been introduced in every
phase of the subject. But with all the improvements of
modern legislation, the system is necessarily far fr.om per-
feet; the time has been too short for approximate attainment
to perfection. Able. men have made vigorous attacks upon the
privilege of the witness, which has been the subject of this
thesis, and it is entirely worth our while to look, very brief-
ly, at the grounds upon which this privilege rests and the
probability of. change. This conclusion will make no attempt
to smrnarize even th~e many arguments against the present sys-
tem, but will be confined to a glance at the relative value
and permanence of the reasons upon wh ich the privilege must
rest. It must be understood, however, that the privilege
off the witness and of the accused, stand or fall tog ether.
To retain the privilege of the accused and. do away with that
of the witness, would only result in the prosecuting officer's
accusing the wrong man, in order that he mighit thus freely
examine all suspects. The reeasons upon which the principle
in question is sustained are six in number.
(1) The prevention of perjury.
(2) Prevention of deception of judges and jurymen,
(3) Encour rge.rnt of witnesses.
(4) Difficulties in the practice of the inquisitorial
system.
(5) Danger of abuse of the inquisitorial system.
(3) The natural protest of free men against an inquisi-
torial system, which would extract incriminating evidence
either by the bodily tQrture of the rack, or the mental tor-
ture of a merciless cross-examination.
The first two of these reasons are no longer valuable.
They were the reasons assigned for those exclusionary rules
which the reforms have set aside. The third reason is over
come by the effectiveness of our system for the enforced at-
tendance of witnesses. Difficulties would undoubtedly arise
in the enforcement of a provision compelling answers, obsti-
nate witnesses would be met with; but these same difficulties
have been met and surmounted in the enforcement of equity
degrees. Obstinate witnesses have been successfully dealt
with where the motives of refusal were fully as strong as the
fear of self incrimination. The tendency to non-disclosur'e
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where the answer would lead to civil loss, is often just as
C...reat as where incrimination would result, but no complaint
has ben .made a(ainst the operation of the rule compilling
disclosure.
The last two ar;ytments are of much ; reater importance.
They broi.,{ht about the adoption of the rule; the others are
academic considerations added by the judges and text writers
to bolster up weak points. The inquisitorial system has been
abuscd whenever and wherever tried. .o what extent t'lis a-
buse was carried in England ori, be seen in the repotts of the
Stte trials and the Star Chamber Proceedings. In France,
at th- ,resent time, the judge browbeats the prisoner, intim-
idates him, seeks to entrap him, :ttcmpts in every ;l.anner to
corkscrew out of him some incriminatingS evidence. But Eng-
land, up to the Revolution of 1688, a-ed prance to the present
time, had never really used any otherplan. In American
courts, with the history o, 'th. mast as a j-:uide, different re-
sults mijht at least be expected.
The !Thst reason is certizuLy entitled~ to consideration.
It is met by th:e sti:tement that 'men object to' Jiviu;- testimo-
ry self incriminatin[;,simply and only on accounrt of th.e pu.n-
ishment which it involvtstL .t t'w<vY fth etmn a
cey'tainl-T be coinsidered no -,rd.er t rn the punis.ment; that if
hic natural objection to -ivir- self incri iuatiw , evidencc is
sfficient o ecuse is tura objectio to purishrmet
should -lso excuse him from that.
I think this is sufficient to show that thie privilege of
the witness and of the accused does not rest upon unassailable
grounds. That these Lrounds will be vigorously attacked is
beyond doubt. It is probably safe to say that some state
will experiment with a return to the inquisitorial system.
Such an experiment would be watched with the greatest interest,
and of course, upon it5 success or failure would depend to a
large degree the future of the principle outlined in the pre-
ceding pages.
